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THE IMMORALITY AND INEFFICIENCY OF AN EFFICIENT
BREACH
DAWINDER S. SIDHU*
INTRODUCTION
The American economy’s recent decline is one of the most significant issues
facing the American public and its leaders today. This economic slump was caused
by several factors, including the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the deflation of the
“dot com” bubble. For the purposes of this Article, the most important factor is the
offensive behavior of three categories of actors in the American market: 1) major
corporations, 2) those purporting to objectively account for the financial activities of
these corporations, and 3) analysts who provide the lay investor with ostensibly
reliable information about these corporations.
The American and international communities have witnessed a severe
collapse in faith in the market due to what Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan described as an “infectious greed.”1 This attitude of greed and
irresponsibility has not only infected major corporations, prestigious brokerage
houses, and once disinterested accounting firms, but has also deflated the precious
earnings and savings of thousands of employees and investors. Moreover, loyal
workers have been deprived of these indispensable earnings and savings while the
executives and corrupt analysts have added millions to their own bank accounts.
The acuteness and pervasiveness of this greed—the extent of which is still
being uncovered—combined with the apparent lack of legal safeguards to eliminate
such gross behavior (or the failure to enforce the safeguards that do exist), has
resulted in a crippled market and a significant decline in consumer confidence. More
importantly, the American people are now questioning the existence or efficacy of
the rule of law in the business world, and are also considering whether morality has
had any relevance in either the daily market operations or the rule of law.
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As criminal prosecutions of certain actors are pending and as other guilty
parties still defy detection, the severity of these greedy practices remains unknown.
This uncertainty is precisely why American consumers are still wary of the market.
This decline in consumer confidence necessitates a meaningful analysis of the
relationship between the law, morality, and profit-motivated activities. The result of
this analysis may exacerbate or alleviate the public’s confidence in the legal system, in
moral principles, and in self-interested actors (e.g., a corporate officer or even a
single consumer); however, at least some uncertainty may be dispelled.
This Article attempts to analyze a concept in contract law known as the
doctrine of efficient breach, which “compels [or at least encourages or invites] a
party to a contract to breach if they can compensate the other party and remain
better off than if they had fully performed the contract.”2 This doctrine appears to
encourage immoral conduct, namely the breach of a contract. However, in the name
of economic efficiency, wealth maximization, and social wealth, several prominent
legal scholars, including Judge Richard A. Posner, the “leader of the school of Law
and Economics movement,”3 have argued that an efficient breach is justified. In
contrast, the efficient breach theory has been challenged by a number of critics,
including Charles Fried.
As contracts form the very basis of business-related activities and, as we shall
see, the essence of social interaction itself, the study of contract law helps us
understand the present socioeconomic climate and the legal apparatus that is
supposed to control socially undesirable behavior. The doctrine of efficient breach
exists on the cutting edge of contract law, particularly as the influence of economic
analysis continues to grow in the law.4 Consequently, a critique of this doctrine
provides useful insights into the relation between law, morality, and contracting.
The analysis of the efficient breach doctrine will enrich the current debate on
whether an opportunistic breach is moral and should be endorsed by the law. If it is
Craig S. Warkol, Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the
Theory of Efficient Breach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1998) [hereinafter Warkol].
2

Scott T. Powers, Commerce—A Retreat from Clarity: The Supreme Court Adds a Wrinkle to the “Aggregated
Effects” Doctrine of its Commerce Clause Jurisprudence—United States v. Morrison, 519 U.S. 598 (2000), 75
TEMP. L. REV. 163, 194 (2002).
3

See David O. Brink, Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner Decew, eds., Theory and Practice: NOMOS XXXVII, 47
J. LEGAL EDUC. 270, 272 (1997) (book review) (“One of the striking changes in the law curriculum in
recent years has been the significant increase in theoretical and interdisciplinary study. The influential
and growing law and economics movement is just the most salient instance of this trend . . . .”).
4
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shown that a contract should be breached to further the wealth of specific actors or
society as a whole, then those concerned with the current decline in morally
satisfactory conduct among the aforementioned categories of actors should be
especially anxious. If, on the other hand, the doctrine of efficient breach is an empty
promise, either a victory for morality must be signaled or it must be shown that the
economic justification for an efficient breach is faulty. Accordingly, a discussion of
this doctrine from moral and economic perspectives will help shed light on the
relation between morality and contracting as a whole.
Part I will explain the doctrine of efficient breach, particularly its economic
justifications, and will offer examples of circumstances where a breach of contract is
argued to be efficient and socially desirable. Part II will discuss the nature of
contracting as an institution and its importance in the development of society. Due
to this importance, the rule of law must respect the will of the parties and other
philosophical virtues, such as liberty, autonomy, and freedom. Part III will present
the moral opposition to the doctrine, specifically the objections of Fried and his
contemporaries. This Part will also offer a rejoinder to the moral commentators in
Judge Posner’s finding that morality is merely an expression of value judgments and,
consequently, that it is irrelevant in an appraisal of the legal doctrine. In Part IV,
Posner’s reply and the economic justifications for the efficient breach will be proven
inadequate. Moreover, current remedies for breach of contract will be found
insufficient to deter an efficient breach or fully compensate those affected. As a
result, it will be concluded that legal scholars should refrain from encouraging this
doctrine. They should perhaps content themselves with the intellectual intrigue that
the doctrine has generated,5 and discuss the theory purely as an academic exercise in
the confines of law schools, rather than promote its use in real life.

Law professors and students are widely exposed to the doctrine of efficient breach. See Thomas S.
Ulen, Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why It Matters, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 643,
645 (2001) (book review); Warkol, supra note 2, at 321 (“The theory of efficient breach is a powerful
academic tool.”).
5
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PART I. THE DOCTRINE OF EFFICIENT BREACH
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do
not keep it, —and nothing else. . . . If you commit a [breach of] contract, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference.6
- Oliver Wendell Holmes
A. Definition and Examples
This famous quote by eminent judge and pragmatist7 Oliver Wendell Holmes
is the basis for the doctrine of efficient breach. Objective examination of the law has
been stated to be “a jurisprudence that, like legal realism, draws on the philosophy of
pragmatism.”8 In his seminal paper, The Path of the Law, Holmes determined that the
law is a prediction of what judges will do.9 The law is indeterminate since a judge is
not entirely bound by past decisions, precedent may not be on point, and the judge
may use any number of different considerations in reaching a decision (e.g.,
“anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, empathy, . . . metaphor,
analogy, precedent, custom, memory, ‘experience,’ intuition, and induction”10). No
one can accurately predict how a judge may decide a case or what reasoning he will
use to justify his legal conclusions. As a result, if a client comes into an attorney’s
office and asks what “the law is” in his particular circumstance, the best the attorney
can do is offer a prediction of what the judge may do. This prediction may be based
on existing precedents, the attorney’s understanding of the judge’s own personal
experiences or views, and any other relevant consideration that the attorney feels
may impact the judge’s reasoning.
In cases involving a breach of contract, Holmes recognized that the law
requires the breaching party to pay only compensatory damages.11 This is primarily
6

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes].

See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
[hereinafter JURISPRUDENCE].

7

8

Id. at xii.

9

Holmes, supra note 6, at 461.

10

OF JURISPRUDENCE

19 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990)

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 73.

See Geoffrey R. Watson, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV.
1749, 1750 (1997) [hereinafter Watson].
11
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due to the fact that remedies in contract law are historically intended to compensate
and not to punish.12 “Contract law, [Holmes] argued, simply compensates for
breach; it does not punish for moral failure.”13 Thus, the reason a party breaches a
contract does not matter. As Posner states, “the law [of contracts] doesn’t really care
about intentions.”14 The remedy is the same even if the breach is considered
“immoral,” and notwithstanding the intent of the breaching party. Summarizing
Holmes’ understanding of a breach, and the law in general, Posner writes that “the
legal duty to keep a promise is merely a prediction that if you don’t keep it you’ll
have to pay for any harm that breaking your promise imposes on the promisee.”15
If a party enters into a contract and subsequently learns of another possible
contract that would give him a greater profit, he may be tempted to breach the first
in order to enter into the second. He may not mind paying damages to the nonbreaching party16 so that he may enter into the second, more profitable contract. For
example, A enters into a contract with B wherein A is to deliver 5,000 widgets in
three months for $50,000. However, a month later, A learns that C is willing to pay
$110,000 for delivery of the same 5,000 widgets. A will breach the contract since he
will obtain at least $10,000 more in profit after compensating B for either B’s reliance
damages or damages based on A’s expected gains. To summarize,
The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been
compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but
compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.
“Willful” breaches have not been distinguished from other breaches,
punitive damages have not been awarded for breach of contract, and
specific performance has not been granted where compensation in
damages is an adequate substitute for the injured party. In general,
therefore, a party may find it advantageous to refuse to perform a
Stephen B. Katz, The California Tort of Bad Faith Breach, the Dissent in Seaman’s v. Standard Oil, and the
Role of Punitive Damages in Contract Doctrine, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 521 (1987) (“One of the oldest saws
in contract law is the assertion that damages are designed to compensate, and not to punish.”).
12

13

Watson, supra note 11, at 1750.

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS
1999) [hereinafter PROBLEMATICS].
14

15

OF

MORAL

AND

LEGAL THEORY 208 (Belknap Press

Id. at 207.

16 These damages may include, for example, the reasonable reliance costs endured by the other party
or the expected benefit that the other party reasonably anticipated he would receive.
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contract if he will still have a net gain after he has fully compensated
the injured party for the resulting loss.17
B. Economic Justifications
Posner and other adherents to the law and economics school argue that a
breach in such circumstances as our example is “efficient.” Efficiency is measured in
several ways. First, an economic action is said to be efficient if it is Pareto superior,
meaning that someone is made better off without making any person worse off.18 In
our example, a breach would be efficient since A would be better off by at least
$10,000 and B is said not to be worse off since he receives compensation.
Under a second measurement of efficiency, the Kaldor-Hicks standard, an
economic action is said to be efficient if the new outcome makes those who benefit
sufficiently better off so that they would still receive an increase in utility even if they
compensated the losers.19 In other words, “a benefit to one individual, even if it
carries with it a loss to another, increases society’s welfare so long as the benefited
party is able fully to compensate the losing party and to remain better off than
before.”20 In our example, A’s breach of his contract with B is efficient under the
Kaldor-Hicks standard since he is able (even if he is not required) to compensate B and
still be better off by at least $10,000 after contracting with C. The Kaldor-Hicks
measure of efficiency is essentially the same as Posner’s measure of wealth
maximization.21 Wealth maximization, which is a more callous representation of the
Kaldor-Hicks standard, “requires only that the winners’ gains exceed the losers’
losses.”22

17 Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 111, 111 (1981) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note
(1981)) [hereinafter Linzer].
18

JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 97 (1988).

19

Id. at 98.

20

Linzer, supra note 17, at 114.

See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 (1980).

21

22

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 389.

2006]

THE IMMORALITY AND INEFFICIENCY OF AN EFFICIENT BREACH

67

Thomas Schelling offers another helpful, albeit rudimentary, means of
analyzing whether an action increases efficiency. Schelling states that economists
must “explore whether, in respect of alternative outcomes or consequences, some
alternative policy or condition or program technique is ‘better.’”23 Thus, A’s move
was efficient since the contract with C is more profitable than the original contract
with B. Conversely, it would have been inefficient for A to honor his contract with
B since there is “something better” that he is aware of, namely the contract with C.
Economists, including Coase24 and Posner,25 also evaluate efficiency by
examining whether the good, service, or entitlement resides with the party that values
it more. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth explains, “Economic analysis posits that if
there is a second buyer who values the widget more highly than you or I do, it is
efficient for that buyer to acquire the widget.”26 In the example above, the 5,000
widgets will be provided to C, who is willing to pay $110,000 for their delivery—a
price that is greater than B’s price. That C values the delivery of the widgets more
than B is reflected in this greater contract price. Since A is always self-interested, he
will be on the lookout for better deals, and, of course, will be receptive to ones that
will provide him with a larger return. Posner, and similarly minded commentators,
advocate efficient breaches because social wealth is increased with efficient
transactions. Society is at least $10,000 better off if A contracts with C after A
breaches with B. Posner proclaims, “[t]he ultimate test of a rule derived from
economic theory is not the elegance or logicality of the derivation but the rule’s
effect on social wealth.”27 Viewed in this light, an efficient breach is socially
desirable and socially advantageous since it enlarges social wealth.
The merit of these economic justifications will be assessed in Part IV.
23

Thomas C. Schelling, Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, 63 THE PUB. INT. 37, 50 (1981).

24

See Robert Cooter, Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1982).

See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The promisor may
simply have discovered that his performance is worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is
promoted by allowing him to break his promise, provided he makes good the promisee’s actual
losses.”); Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 274 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Many breaches . .
. are ‘efficient’ in the sense that they allow resources to be moved into a more valuable use.” (citing
Patton, 841 F.2d at 750-51)); Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 577, 589 (1987).
25

E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss of My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of
Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1380 (1985) [hereinafter Farnsworth].

26

27

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 362.
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PART II. THE ESSENCE OF CONTRACTING
Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the
meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one
another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.28
- Adam Smith
A. The Birth of Society
Imagine, if you will, a natural state of man, a hypothetical and abstract
situation in which individuals are in a pre-social state with no organized society—no
laws, no rules, and no authoritative agency; they are in the “original position.”29
Individuals in this primitive state survived by consuming goods that they
themselves produced. One can envision the hunter, perhaps even a pack of hunters,
killing an animal that he or they would feast on later that evening. Or one can
imagine a family of farmers that produces certain plants and animals for sustenance.
While such a process can be entirely internal (e.g., within the family unit or a clan
based on family relationships), there comes a point where the self-satisfying dynamic
is no longer sufficient to provide the members of the group with their requisite
needs or wants.
For example, an injured husband and pregnant wife are unable to mend their
house that was recently devastated by an act of God; therefore, they require the
services of another individual, a physician, who does not depend on this family for
his sustenance or livelihood. The husband needs medical attention so he will be able
to repair the roof of the house and provide a living for the mother and the arriving
child.
As another example, a unit may have had an extremely productive hunt or
bountiful harvest and thus is in possession of an excess of food. Rather than let this
surplus go to waste, as a unit can only consume a limited amount since the fruits of
its labor will become inedible with time, the unit will want to barter this surplus for
other goods or services. The surplus can be of some value and provide some utility
to someone else, even though the unit itself cannot consume the surplus.
28 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 21 (9th
ed. 1799) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH].
29

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15-17 (1971).
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As a final example, suppose there is an extraordinarily successful unit with a
sizable surplus, or a unit that is simply tired of consuming the same goods. A unit in
either of these positions will desire to barter some of its goods in exchange for
others in order to obtain a diverse set of consumable goods—perhaps a loaf of bread
where the unit habitually consumes chicken. A successful unit with a surplus of
goods may simply desire to possess a luxury good that is worthy simply because it is
possessed—for instance, a sculpture.
In each of these instances, it is clear that the families or small units will desire
to exchange part of their goods—whether out of the main share or out of a
surplus—in order to obtain other goods or services that they are unable to produce
internally. As Adam Smith noted, “[man] supplies the far greater part of [goods or
labor that is produced in surplus] by exchanging that surplus . . . which is over and
above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as
he has occasion for.”30 The farmer who still brings in corn by the bushel can now
have imported tea to go along with his meal; the injured man can not only obtain
medical services, but can also find someone to repair his house and perhaps also
someone to help deliver the baby.
Accordingly, social interaction is necessary for the families and group units to
achieve better, more enjoyable lives. More eloquently, as Fried states, “a regime of
mutual respect allows men and women to accomplish what in a jungle of
unrestrained self-interest could not be accomplished.”31 Through such interaction,
individuals not only benefit more than they would in an isolated situation, but they
also reduce the risk that each would have otherwise faced on their own.32
Since people in a state of nature are similarly situated—that is, generally
subject to the same basic needs and same risks that nature may unfortunately
confer— it is inevitable that all individuals will be interested in exchanging.
Accordingly, there are many people who could benefit from social interaction,
30

Smith, supra note 28, at 33.

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
[hereinafter PROMISE].
31

AS

PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 17 (1981)

32 Political philosopher Thomas Hobbes believed that the primary benefit of society was to control
violence and aggression and thereby reduce risk and uncertainty. PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THE NEW
SOCIAL QUESTION: RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE 11-12 (Barbara Harshav trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 2000) (1995). Indeed, a French revolutionary, Clavière, wrote that the sharing of this
mutual risk combined with the insurance that a community creates brings individuals together. Id. at
12.
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including everyone in the region that can be reached by available methods of
transportation and communication. As Adam Smith states:
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it
is but a very small part of a man’s wants which the produce of his
own labour can supply. He supplies the far greater part of them by
exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which
is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the
produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for. Every man
thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant,
and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial
society.33
Moreover, as the dynamic of exchange continues, the ability to
produce will necessarily increase due to the fact that men will innovate (i.e.,
improve their goods and services) because they know they are able to
exchange with others. Smith observed,
[T]he certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the
produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own
consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as
he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to
a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection
whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of
business.34
Society thus develops because of, and is dependent on, the social interaction
that takes place due to the freedom to exchange and the knowledge that others will
invariably exchange out of want or need. With the pool of consumers likely to equal
the number of individuals in the society, and with the increased productivity of these
consumers, the frequency of interaction will increase rapidly. A market, or, more
correctly, a “commercial society,” emerges.
B. Formal Contracting in Society
As society develops, the number of participants in the market and the
number of transactions increase. Accordingly, as society grows, the probability of
33

SMITH, supra note 28, at 33.

34

Id. at 23.
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fraudulent transactions increases and problems with the exchange process surface.
For instance, a consumer may be upset that the table he obtained for a month’s
supply of ripe tomatoes was not made of oak, but of a wood of inferior quality,
despite the table-maker’s assurances that the table would be made of oak. Or a
consumer may not believe it is fair that he must surrender milk from his cows or face
a beating by a coalition of brutes who either have no resources of their own to
barter, or simply wish to hoard what they have and use their strength to obtain goods
for nothing in return.
It is clear that men in a state of nature do not have to refrain from abhorrent
or unfair conduct. Since there is no authority to prevent such conduct, aside from
another, more powerful person who imposes his own will, an individual can act as he
pleases. There is, of course, no assurance that these actions will be in accord with
what a majority of the members of a community deem honest, fair, or right. This
leads to John Stuart Mill’s famous declaration: “The only freedom which deserves
the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”35 Such a
statement is only useful if it can be enforced. Enforcement can only occur either
through those who appeal to their own consciences, or through a supervising entity.
The fact that people sometimes act in a socially undesirable manner implies that not
all individuals limit their own conduct. The sanctions imposed by one’s conscience
(e.g., shame or guilt) are often insufficient to deter conduct that harms others. This
leads to an obvious conclusion: societies require governments to enforce social
norms of proper behavior. More specifically, market activities must be subject to
some sort of supervision.
In order for this governmental entity to emerge, the individuals who wish to
avail themselves of the benefits of the superior agency must not only consent to the
authority of this body, but must also surrender some of the rights they could have
exercised in an original position or state of nature. John Locke wrote, “there only is
political society where every one of the members has given up his natural power,
surrendered it into the hands of the community . . . . And thus . . . the community
comes to be the umpire by settled standing rules, impartial and the same to all parties
. . . .”36
35 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198, 199 (Joel Feinberg &
Hyman Gross eds., 1995). Mill qualified or explained this principle by differentiating between
“harm” and “offense;” the former exists as an infringement of others’ rights while the latter does not.
Id. at 201-02.

JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, in 3 CLASSICS
WORLD 68, 72 (Edgar E. Knoebel ed., 4th ed., 1988).
36

OF

WESTERN THOUGHT, THE MODERN
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Superior agency must exist in order to establish a general set of “standing
rules” to govern all socially undesirable conduct, and, more specifically, to fix a set of
standards by which transactions occur. Moreover, the superior agency must
determine whether a violation of these rules has occurred, and levy sanctions
accordingly. What should such standards, or laws, contain? It is helpful to think of
the law as an actual person, an “umpire” in the words of Locke,37 who supervises the
bargaining process between a seller and buyer.
The first problem for society is how to regulate these transactions to ensure
they are voluntarily made. Economist Milton Friedman correctly stated that “[t]he
basic problem of social organization is how to co-ordinate the economic activities of
large numbers of people.”38 He further acknowledged that an essential role of law
and order is “to prevent physical coercion of one individual by another.”39 The law,
as our hypothetical person or “umpire,” would ensure that a buyer would not be
beaten up for his goods or threatened to exchange for a cheaper price. The concepts
of duress and undue influence in contract law ensure that threats or compulsion are
not used to secure a transaction.40
Once it is determined that the two parties are bargaining voluntarily and
freely, the law requires that there be an offer, an acceptance of the offer, and
consideration between the two parties. An offer and acceptance are merely
procedural requirements; consideration is the exchange of a promise for either a
promise or performance. However, the law will not assess the relative values of what
is being exchanged; it will merely ensure that something valuable is in fact
exchanged. As Fried opines, “[G]oodness of the exchange is for the parties alone to
judge—the law is concerned only that there be an exchange.”41 Moreover, “a system
in which judges may—in the absence of fraud, duress, or some other demonstrable
defect in the formation process—second-guess the wisdom of the parties may create
37

See id.

38

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 12 (1962).

39

Id. at 14.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (1981). Even if an individual is not being
coerced by another individual, he may still be acting involuntarily (e.g., if he is mentally incompetent).
The defense of incapacity in contract law ensures that contracts are voluntarily entered into,
notwithstanding the conduct of the other market participant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 12 (1981).
40

41

PROMISE, supra note 31, at 29.
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more substantive unfairness than it cures,”42 as the judge’s intervention may disrupt
the reasonable expectations that both parties had in benefiting from the particular
exchange and in the contracting process generally. However, the law does not accept
“sham consideration,” for example, “[w]here a father exchanges $5000 for a
peppercorn from his son, such a promise is not enforceable.”43 If an offer and
acceptance are communicated effectively and timely, and if something valuable is
exchanged, the law will disturb the exchange only in very exceptional circumstances,
including duress, unconscionability, mutual mistake, and frustration of purpose.44
Another necessary step in the evolution of a sophisticated market is the
establishment of a monetary system, such that one can exchange goods for money
and then use money to buy goods and services from others. It is with money that
the value of goods and services is quantified, and the process of exchange becomes
easier. As Fredrich Hayek explained, “[P]rices can act to co-ordinate the separate
actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to
coordinate the parts of his plan.”45 Adam Smith also stated:
To prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to
encourage all sorts of industry and commerce, it has been found
necessary . . . to affix a public stamp upon certain quantities of such
particular metals . . . . It is in this manner that money has become . . .
the universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which
goods of all kinds are bought and sold, or exchanged for one
another.46

42

Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 286 (1986).

Craig Leonard Jackson, Traditional Contract Theory: Old and New Attacks and Old and New Defenses, 33
NEW ENG. L. REV. 365, 401 (1999).

43

See Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
21, 34 (1998) (noting that this “policing function” is served by “the doctrines of duress, fraud,
concealment, misrepresentation, unconscionability, mistake, impracticability, and supervening
frustration.”); Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-ups,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (“Courts are reluctant to police agreements so as not to undermine
‘the policy favoring the stability of transactions and the protection of the parties’ expectations.’”)
(quoting E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.1 (2d ed. 1990)).
44

45 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945), available at
http://www.virtualschool.edu/mon/Economics/HayekUseOfKnowledge.html.
46

SMITH, supra note 28, at 37, 41.
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The superior agency can act to regulate the initial distribution and continuous
issuance of money, and to ensure that transactions themselves are conducted
properly.
In the simple scenario that we have examined so far, one member of society
exchanges goods (e.g., vegetables, or the monetary equivalent thereof) for other
goods (e.g., wine, or the monetary equivalent thereof). The marketplace, and the
broader society that arises around it, is primarily based on these immediate
transactions. The law overseeing the exchange between two individuals would surely
ensure that one party would not beat up the other for a better price, or that one party
would not defraud the other. Less obvious, and certainly not beyond question, is
whether the law would permit a seller to make a contract, break it, compensate the
buyer, run to the other side of the market, and engage in a contract with another
buyer who offers a better price. This sequence of events is said to benefit the person
who has breached his first contract and entered into the second, and thus, indirectly,
to enhance the welfare of every single person in the society.
PART III. THE MORAL OBJECTION
Leges sine Moribus vanae
(Laws without morals are in vain)47
- Motto of the University of Pennsylvania
A. Exchange as Freedom
Absent the identified anomalies of incapacity, duress, fraud, et cetera, the
transactions entered into by the parties should be respected and enforced. In other
words, our hypothetical person representing the law should step aside and not
intervene in the bargaining process except to ensure a real and voluntary agreement.
Fried declares, “Parties enter into contractual relations with certain expectations; for
the state to disappoint those expectations is on its part a form of tyranny and
deception.”48
A choice, such as whether to enter into a market transaction, is an exercise of
freedom. Transactions are a genuine representation of one’s liberty as a market
University of Pennsylvania Almanac, Ceremonial Symbols and Objects, Oct. 19, 2004,
http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/volumes/v51/n08/inaug_symbols.html.

47

48

PROMISE, supra note 31, at 91.
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participant. Each exchange demonstrates and expresses an individual’s freedom to
barter goods, to pursue and acquire items that he cannot produce himself, to satisfy
wants and needs that he determines, and to make decisions based on a priority of
needs with his individual conception of the good in mind. Moreover, men and
women of all belief systems and backgrounds may participate in the market, as long
as they respect the equal right of participation enjoyed by others. Above all, these
people—with their own metaphysical, superficial, or political differences—are free
individuals who can congregate despite this rich diversity. For example, a wealthy
Iranian female can buy Chinese food from a Caucasian male atheist. Such freedom
of exchange manifests choice, encourages solidarity, and promotes diversity. In
short, the market itself is a product of people’s freedom to choose and exchange as
they wish. It is an extension of liberty providing members of society with the
continuous and almost unadulterated ability to exercise their individual freedom.
The essential reason why individuals enter into transactions and contracts is
that one consumer requires or wants goods that he cannot produce himself, and is
willing to part with a possession of his own or is willing to work to obtain that good.
The law as a mediating and supervising entity may not know why this person
requires or wants a particular good or service, or why he is willing to sacrifice certain
goods or services in order to obtain it. However, the fact that the individual has
voluntarily and freely entered into the market indicates that this person desires to
improve his utility, the utility of his family, or the utility of the unit he represents. As
Posner writes, “Neither party would sign the contract unless he thought he would be
better off as a result”49 When he arrives to the market, he may enter into a
transaction that most of us would not enter into; he may assign a value or ask for a
price that we may not agree with. However, it is not the law’s function to secondguess or judge a participant’s actions when they are voluntary and free. The role of
an umpire or supervisor is different from that of a third-party injecting his own
subjective value as if he were the actual participant. We may not know why a
consumer wishes to bargain so hard for pink fabric, even though he could obtain
fabric with other attractive colors more cheaply. Perhaps he wishes to give this
fabric to his daughter (who prefers pink) for her birthday, or perhaps he knows of a
person in another region who would be willing to pay even more for this same
fabric. We simply do not know.
The respect society affords to people to barter in the market as they please
(absent the aforementioned exceptions) parallels the respect that the participants
must give each other. Accordingly, the law should not disturb participants’ freely
chosen transactions. The respect for other parties to bargain (i.e., members of
49

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 388.
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society are allowed to bargain) and the respect we ask of other participants (i.e., we
should not be disturbed when we do bargain) are just as important as the honor we
must conduct ourselves with (i.e., I should not complain if the transaction does not
turn out favorably). A party to a transaction may not afterwards ask to be relieved
from the folly of his choices. He has asked for the freedom to contract and has
entered into the contract with the expectation that he will profit from the interaction.
If this expectation proves to be unfounded, it is not anyone else’s duty to remedy
these disappointed expectations. Plainly, the individual has assumed the risk of his
own endeavors. Fried writes that “[o]thers must respect our capacity as free and
rational persons to choose our own good, and that respect means allowing persons
to take responsibility for the good they choose.”50 More bluntly, he states, “[W]hat
we achieve [is] our own and our failures [are] our responsibility too . . . .”51
B. Immorality of Breaching a Contract
According to Professor Peter Linzer, “‘Morality’ stands for the idea that it is
both fair and appropriate to hold people to promises that they freely made.”52 This
is because the party in breach voluntarily entered into a contract with another
individual. As Fried notes, “The moral force behind contract as promise is
autonomy: the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to be.”53 In
other words, the parties’ contractual obligations are “self-imposed,”54 and the party
in breach not only foresaw reliance, but invited it.55 “To renege [on a promise] is to
abuse a confidence he was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally did
invite.”56
Fried’s view of a contract is that the individual has expressed his autonomy in
seeking out a contract, and has willingly entered into an agreement. Therefore, by
entering into a contract, he has committed himself, or more specifically his will, since
50

PROMISE, supra note 31, at 20.

51

Id. at 8.

52

Linzer, supra note 17, at 112.

53

PROMISE, supra note 31, at 57 (emphasis added).

54

See id. at 2.

55

Id. at 11.

56

Id. at 16.
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“persons may impose on themselves obligations where none existed before.”57
Based on this principle of autonomy, it is immoral for a party to breach a contract
since he sought to benefit from the bargaining process or a formal contract in the
first place.58
Fried is undoubtedly correct that it is inappropriate for a person to “back
out” of a contractual relationship that he willingly made. As noted before,
individuals are inherently self-interested, and an individual who comes to the market
surely does so with the intention of obtaining a benefit from the transaction that he
has chosen. He wishes to profit from the institution of the market, yet in breaching
a contract, he is not only failing to honor a commitment he intentionally made and
agreed to, but he is also upsetting the reasonable expectations of the other party.
Thus, a party’s breach injures the market and the mechanism of contracting—the
very mechanism that allowed him to attempt to gain from the exchange with others.
In other words, it is dishonorable individually and degrading collectively, both to the
market and to the method of securing commitments (i.e., contracts), for one party to
breach a contract.
The damage to the individual is that, in breaching a contract, he is breaking
his word, a commitment he voluntarily made. In so doing, he has demonstrated that
he values personal gain over social cooperation59 and mutual respect. Again, one
who breaches a contract possesses a “bias . . . in favor of individual, uncooperative
behavior as opposed to behavior requiring the cooperation of the parties.”60
Gary Akerlof’s writings explain the damage that breaches impose on the
market and the incentives for contracting.61
Breaches undermine market
participants’ confidence that an obligor will actually keep his commitment when the
time for performance arrives. The value of a contract will decrease because each
57

Id. at 1.

58

See id. at 17, 20.

59 See PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 108 (stating that law and morality “are parallel methods . . . for
bringing about the kind and degree of cooperation that a society needs in order to prosper” (emphasis
added)).
60 Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 968 (1982)
[hereinafter Macneil].
61 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining uncertainty’s effect on the market).

78

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 8

market participant will discount for the fact that the other party may or may not keep
his contract. Akerlof provides used cars as an example.62 Individuals interested in
purchasing a used car will consider, when assigning a value to each used car, whether
the car may be a “good” car or a “lemon.”63 Even though a car may be good (an
honored contract), the possibility that it may be a lemon (a breached contract) leads
one to undervalue every car (every contract) out of fear that one may end up with a
lemon (a breached contract). 64 Accordingly, the sale of each lemon (a breach of
contract) undermines the confidence of used car buyers and dealers (market
participants) in the integrity of the relevant market.
Legal scholars with a moralistic perspective who object to the doctrine of
efficient breach adopt the general approach of the previous section,65 but take the
analysis one step further. To these individuals, it is “immoral” or “wrong” to disturb
an exchange outside of a few recognized exceptions, even if in doing so the
breaching party (and ostensibly society) will be able to benefit from the second, more
lucrative contract. For example, Professor Linzer writes, “It seems right that people
who make fair bargains should be held to them. Absent unconscionability,
incapacity, or a like excuse, it should be wrong to break a contract. . . . More
important, it is simply right that one get what he was promised.”66 Fried, while
agreeing with these commentators that a breach of contract is immoral, frames the
argument in terms of the libertarian concepts of commitment, reliance, and
voluntarily binding one’s will.67 However, the implications of Fried’s comments,
revealed by the explicit language of scholars like Linzer, make the moral argument
against efficient breaches more amenable to attack from the law and economics

62

Id. at 489-92.

63

Id. at 489.

This fear is explained by the fact that people are risk averse, meaning they “dislike the uncertainty”
about losses and the magnitude of the losses. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 186 (1987).
64

65

See supra Part III. A.

66

Linzer, supra note 17, at 111, 138 (emphasis added).

67 However, Fried’s writing is not entirely free of strong moralistic references. For example, Fried
states, “If I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my promise, it is fair
that I should be made to hand over the equivalent of the promised performance.” PROMISE, supra
note 31, at 17 (emphasis added).
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school. Arguing that it is “immoral” or “wrong” to breach a contract may be a more
pronounced expression of the view that it is dishonorable to break one’s word.68
C. Regret
Perhaps what is most frustrating to the critics of the efficient breach doctrine
is that the breaching party is trying to benefit from a breach of a prior obligation. In
other words, the breaching party agreed to a contract at time x, yet is breaching at
time x+1, despite the fact that he voluntarily and freely bound himself at time x. If
the breaching party realizes that the new contract opportunity is potentially more
profitable, either he should have entered into this contract in the first place
(assuming he knew about the more profitable contract), or he should have waited
and not bound himself at time x (assuming he did not know about the more
profitable contract).69 The inappropriateness of an efficient breach is thus that the
party in breach is attempting to “recapture opportunities foregone upon
contracting.”70
When a party breaches in order to pursue a more profitable contract, he is
indicating that the “cost of performing . . . diverge[s] significantly from the
[opportunity] cost that [he] estimated when making the promise.”71 In other words,
a party in breach experiences regret, which is defined by Professor Louis E. Wolcher
as:

68 The former expression may be derived from a system of values where a contract is a “promise,”
while the latter may be traced to a medieval understanding that one’s word is one’s bond; the former
would thus violate values probably thought to be timeless and likely to be shared by many, while the
second would violate an individual’s honor.
69 While the breaching party can address this inadequacy by offering to negotiate a release or
settlement, or by sharing the profits with the non-breaching party, he is by no means required to do
so under the doctrine of efficient breach. He is merely required to pay a compensatory sum, which is
determined by the courts or by a liquidated damages clause if the parties agreed to one at contract
formation. In short, the breaching party will likely breach and wait for the non-breaching party to sue
for damages, rather than approach the non-breaching party to negotiate a release of some sort.
70 Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 369, 373 (1980). This inappropriateness is particularly acute since the non-breaching party to
the original contract is not completely compensated by existing contract remedies, a contention to be
discussed infra.
71

Louis E. Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret in Contract Remedies, 73 IOWA L. REV. 797, 799 (1998).
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[T]he feeling one experiences in hindsight after making a decision
that harms one’s own interests. . . . Regret . . . says, in effect, “I wish
I had made a good deal, but now that I see that I made a bad one
[because there is a more profitable deal out there], I wish I could get
out.”72
An efficient breach, then, is an attempt by the breaching party to transform
an emotive response to a forgone deal (regret and an indifference to the welfare of
the non-breaching party) into a legally sanctioned right to recoup a more profitable
opportunity, even though the breaching party is already bound.
In entering the market, each participant believes that he will benefit from the
exchange he engages in, even if he might be uncertain as to whether he will actually
benefit. In other words, he is taking a risk, much like in the stock market, that an
anticipated gain will materialize into an actual gain. One also assumes the risk that an
anticipated gain may prove to be an unfortunate loss—all investments do not end up
favorably. “Every decision, including the decision to enter into an agreement,
produces the opportunity for . . . regret simply because things may not turn out as
one anticipated when making the decision.”73 The market permits men to take such
risks and provides them with the opportunity to profit; it offers no assurances that
such a profit will ensue.
A breach is an attempt to escape the responsibility of having assumed the
risk of an unfavorable result, and the responsibility to honor an obligation voluntarily
undertaken. The efficient breach theory would allow a party to revisit the decision
he previously made and undo his commitment—or renege on his word—as long as
the breaching party could reap a profit that exceeded the non-breaching party’s loss.
The virtues of social cooperation and reciprocal gain that undergird the market are
degraded when an individual severs a contract for unilateral gain.74 In other words,
both parties enter into a contract so that they can profit off of each other,75 yet an
efficient breach serves only self-interest and destroys this mutuality.

72

Id. at 799-800.

73

Id. at 799.

74 Id. at 837 (“The efficient breach is an economic tool for the unilateral reallocation by the promisor
of resources that seem to belong to the promisee.” (emphasis added)).
75 Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237,
241 (1981) (stating that “parties do not enter into agreements which do not benefit them”).
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The suggestion that an efficient breach is an improper attempt to convert
regret into a permissible “way out” is reminiscent of Plato’s Crito, where Socrates was
advised to flee rather than be executed. He refused, noting that individuals in a citystate are:
[A]t liberty to leave the city . . . if our covenants appeared to you to
be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone [to another state] .
. . . Any of you who does not like us and the city . . . may go where
he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of
the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and
still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as
we command him.76
Similarly, each party to a contract knew the terms of the contract (analogous
to the laws of a city, the difference being the party to a contract voluntarily and
knowingly negotiated the terms, rather than just merely accepting or acquiescing to
them), had the choice to leave (i.e., not enter into the contract) and go anywhere he
wishes (i.e., enter into any number of possible contracts). Accordingly, a party to a
contract who has willingly remained (i.e., entered into the contract and attempted to
avail himself to the possible benefits thereof) cannot later complain and attempt to
escape from the terms, conditions, or provisions that he explicitly (as opposed to
implicitly in the case of Socrates) accepted.
D. Posner’s Reply
Like Holmes, Posner is a pragmatist; as such, he contends that the law must
be more scientific (i.e., more closely rooted in facts drawn from actual experience
and observation).77 Specifically, Posner posits that the law, or more appropriately
judges who render decisions, should be “practical, instrumental, forward-looking,
activist, empirical, skeptical, antidogmatic, experimental.”78
Pragmatists are
concerned mainly with drawing closer to the truth. Morality, however, is not
scientific and does not lead us closer to empirical truth, since morality is about
values, not facts.79 Since moral sentiments are essentially one’s judgments and are
PLATO, Crito, in DIALOGUES OF PLATO 41, 50-52 (Benjamin Jowett trans., The Colonial Press rev.
ed. 1900) (emphasis added), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/crito.html.
76

See James R. Hackney, Jr., The “End” of: Science, Philosophy, and Legal Theory, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 629,
642-43 (2003).
77
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PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 252.
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See JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 351.
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not about facts, “moral philosophy . . . enriches; it neither proves nor edifies.”80
Morality, to Posner, will not lead to any improvement in jurisprudence.81
Moral arguments, thus, preach to the converted, and debate over moral
issues only reinforces or strengthens the veracity of one’s beliefs; it does not draw
one any closer to objective certainty.82 In sum, Posner does not believe that moral
considerations have any relevance in the law, since morality is a statement of one’s
preferences that entrenches rather than eliminates uncertainty, that is unverifiable,
indeterminate, relative, and so general as to be effectively irrelevant in particular legal
disputes.83
Despite this, members of society often rely on morality with the belief that
they are “right” or that morality is capable of progressing towards empirical truth.
As a result, individuals hold onto moral claims very strongly. The problem, as
addressed by Posner, is that if each individual believes that his moral perspective is
correct, we have moral heterogeneity (i.e., more answers) rather than clarity (i.e.,
fewer answers).84
This problem is particularly intense in the United States, since this society
promotes and encourages the expression of different values, belief systems, religions,
et cetera. Accordingly, Posner declares that in a morally heterogeneous society such
as this one, moral debates will be indeterminable.85 The more moral judgments we
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PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 32.
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See id.
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See id. at 90.
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See id. at 42.

See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1656
(1998) (recognizing “moral pluralism within the United States” and stating generally that “[t]he
acceptability of a moral principle is inverse to its capacity to resolve an actual issue.”) [hereinafter
Moral and Legal Theory].
84

See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 861 (1998) (noting that
“with the decline of authority a community becomes morally heterogeneous, to the point where
people may come to inhabit incommensurable moral universes within the same political community,”
citing “the situation of the pro-abortionists and the anti-abortionists in [the United States] today” as
an example of one that “seems to admit of no rationally demonstrable resolution”).
85
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have in this society, the more this heterogeneity will be revealed, and the more
distant all participants will be from any improvement in their value judgments.86
Considering Posner’s general reaction towards morality, he would likely claim
that the assertions that an efficient breach is “immoral,” “wrong,” or “unfair” are
merely restatements of one’s value judgments, public opinion,87 or political
preferences.88 Most importantly, he would state that these value judgments should
be of no concern to judges since moral statements cannot be reduced to verifiable
statements of fact, and, therefore, cannot produce differences in behavior. The law
is obeyed, as Holmes noted, because of sanctions, not necessarily because there is a
duty to do so, or because they are just.89 Thus, an appeal to one’s conscience will not
deter or prevent efficient breaches from occurring.
Economics, however, can and does lead to alterations in behavior. The
economic determination that a breach is “efficient” is a sufficient justification for the
breach. That is, morality does little to improve the actual lives of members of
society, and the consequence of moral debate is a repetition of useless discussion,90
not the advancement of society’s welfare. As noted in the “Economic Justifications”
section supra, Posner believes that an efficient breach actually does increase society’s
welfare through wealth maximization—a tangible benefit to society that morality
cannot controvert. We will now discuss whether the economic arguments
supporting the doctrine of efficient breach are indeed sound or whether they are
empty promises of an increase in social wealth.

Moral and Legal Theory, supra note 84, at 1648 (“In a mutable or pluralistic moral culture, moral
philosophy offers people choices of how to live, or how to think about how to live. In this it
resembles, indeed might be thought a form of, art, religion, or therapy. But it is not a matter of
offering reasoned answers to moral questions.”). More choices based on moral philosophy, according
to Posner, will not lead to demonstrable universal truths.
86

87

See JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 239.

88

See id. at 23.

89

See Holmes, supra note 6, at 459-60.

90 See PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 50 (“Moral theory is like a system of mathematics that has
never gotten beyond addition.”).
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PART IV. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS REVISITED
A model assuming away relations slips with the greatest of ease at any state into favoring
uncooperative and—ironically enough—highly inefficient human behavior.91
- Professor Ian Macneil
A. The Inefficiency of an “Efficient” Breach
The principal economic rationale for an efficient breach is that such a breach
offers more wealth to society, to the breaching party who can obtain a better deal,
and to the party who engages in the new contract with the breaching party. An
examination of the economic justifications for an efficient breach reveals that this
economic rationale is faulty. In addition, while we can conceive of a hypothetical
breach that may be efficient, an efficient breach is not likely to occur in real life. As
a result, even though Posner has discounted the merit of the moral objections to an
efficient breach, an efficient breach is still unlikely to be efficient in real life
experience. Accordingly, an efficient breach is not socially desirable or beneficial,
even when the analysis conducted is purely economic.
1. Indifference of the Non-Breaching Party
One of the assumptions inherent in an efficient breach is that the
compensation provided to the non-breaching party is sufficient to make him
indifferent as to whether the breach occurred. In other words, in the calculus that
deems a breach to be efficient, the damages paid to the promisee relieve the
breaching party of any further obligation to the promisee and free the breaching
party so that he can pursue other contracts.
The assumption that the non-breaching party is indifferent is important
because of the various standards of efficiency, discussed supra, that require the
victim’s losses to be offset by the action. For example, in the Pareto superior
measure of efficiency, no one may be made worse off by a transaction if it is to be
efficient.92 Also, in the Kaldor-Hicks measure of efficiency, a move is efficient if the
breaching party is better off even after compensating the non-breaching party.93
91

Macneil, supra note 60, at 969.
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See supra text accompanying note 18.

93

See supra text accompanying note 19.
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These measures of efficiency include an element of compensation (by the
non-breaching party being compensated so he is not worse off) that is
commensurate with the compensatory goal of contract law remedies. Thus, the
damages that a promisee receives are considered to be sufficient to offset his
financial losses, either by placing him where he would be had the contract been
realized (expectation damages)94 or where he would have been before the contract
was made (reliance or restitution damages).95 Yet none of these three contract
remedies provides a “compensatory sum”96 that will make the promisee indifferent.
Indifference in the promisee, not compensation to the promisee, is what is required
to sufficiently offset the financial losses or reasonable expectation of the promisee.
Professor Mark Seindenfeld writes, “An economic change is Kaldor-Hicks efficient
if the new outcome makes those who benefit sufficiently well off that they would still
end up with an increase in utility even if they compensated the losers enough to make
the losers indifferent.”97 There is a fundamental difference between indifference and
compensation, and while contract remedies address the latter, it is only the former
that will permit the non-breaching party to be adequately “paid off” so that he is not
“worse off” and so that his interests are fully made up for.
For example, Harold Demsetz discusses what regime of liability would be
appropriate where two actors can both exercise due care in avoiding an accident,
such as a driver or a pedestrian on the road.98 Demsetz writes that if drivers are held
liable, they will obviously avoid accidents.99 However, the incentive for pedestrians
to avoid the accidents is decreased because, if drivers are held liable, pedestrians will
be compensated regardless of whether they are careful or not.100 This assumes,
however, that pedestrians are indifferent towards an accident with compensation
94 See Kevin E. Davis, Promissory Fraud: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 535, 537 (2004)
(defining expectation damages as a “measure of damages that will put the promisee in the position he
would have been in if the contract had been performed”).
95 See L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52,
54 (1936).
96

Holmes, supra note 6, at 462.

MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES
Publ’g Co. 1996) (emphasis added).
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versus no accident. A cursory examination of this particular situation should reveal
that anyone in the pedestrians’ circumstance, even if drivers were held to a strict
liability standard, would not be indifferent to an accident with compensation versus
no accident; everyone would choose no accident.
Similarly, with a breach of contract, a party to a contract will not be
indifferent to a breach and compensation versus having full performance. How is it
that the contract remedies are not sufficient to make one indifferent? Indifference is
very easy to ascertain. It is a sum that one would propose when asked, “What could
I pay you in order for you not to care that I breached the contract, even if you
incurred reliance costs and expected me to perform?” A payment of this sum, and
only this sum, will be sufficient to make the promisee indifferent. Yet, this sum is
not guaranteed to be, and likely will not be, the compensatory sum that the courts
will provide to the non-breaching party.
To continue with Demsetz’s example, suppose I am a pedestrian who is hit
by a car and the driver of the car is held strictly liable for the accident. Assume
further that I suffer a broken leg and as a result I miss three days of work. I sue the
driver for the medical costs, the loss of wages from these three days of work, and
emotional suffering from having to endure this life-threatening and painful
experience. The sum, to be ascertained by the courts, will be relatively fixed and
based on the actual medical costs (say, $1,000), three days of wages (say, $500), and
emotional trauma (say, $3,000). The total sum is thus $4,500. If I were asked, “How
much money would it take to make you indifferent to being in the accident?” That
sum would surely be higher than my fixed costs and emotional trauma; it would
surely be higher than $4,500. Accordingly, a compensatory sum is not the same as
an indifference sum. It is possible for one’s indifference sum to be lower than a
compensatory sum; however, contract law remedies do not ensure that a
compensatory sum will include an indifference sum. As a result, a non-breaching
party can, and most likely will, be worse off by a breach (Pareto superior), and a
breaching party may not be better off after paying an indifference sum to the nonbreaching party, as opposed to paying a compensatory sum (Kaldor-Hicks).
Liquidated damages101 represent a way in which a breach can meet the
condition of “promisee-indifference.” For example, suppose A agrees to deliver
45,000 widgets to B in nine months for an important convention that B is attending.
Liquidated damages are agreed to by the parties at the time of contract formation and are
incorporated into the contract as a provision that specifies the amount of relief if a breach is to occur.
Larry A. Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS.
L.J. 633, 633 n.1 (2001) (“Liquidated damages refer to a provision in a contract in which the parties
agree to prevent litigation on the issue of damages in the event of breach.”).
101
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If B has these widgets at the convention, he may be able to resell them for a large
profit of $200,000. The contract price agreed to is $15,000. A, however, feels that
he may be able to procure a more favorable delivery contract for the same 45,000
widgets, perhaps a $35,000 contract with C. Since A is not sure that such a more
lucrative contract will materialize, he binds himself to the present contract with B for
$15,000. A may attempt to negotiate for a liquidated damages clause since there is a
possibility he would have to pay B’s $200,000 expected profits from the delivery and
resale. B may be willing to negotiate for a smaller amount of assured damages
because he realizes that A may breach for a better opportunity, yet understands that
if A is to breach, he would like A to breach sooner rather than later so that he will
have more time to find a replacement deliverer (so that he can realize the $200,000
expected profit from the convention).
A and B can negotiate a favorable liquidated damages sum that will alleviate
the concerns of both parties. One possible sum might be the contract price plus
$3,500 for each month that passes. Therefore, if A breaches a minute after contract
formation, he would pay $15,000 + $3,500 ($18,500), which will allow A to realize a
better opportunity since $18,500 is lower than the $35,000 that C may offer. Yet, if
A breaches in nine months, say a week before performance is due, he would have to
pay $15,000 + $31,500 ($46,500), which is greater than the $35,000 that C may offer;
thus, he would not pursue this contract.102 B has thus negotiated a liquidated
damages sum that induces A to breach early on, if at all. Since the liquidated
damages increase each month, after the fifth month it would no longer be attractive
for A to breach; this is good for B since it would be harder to find a replacement
after that point. And, in case A did breach, B would obtain more money that could
defray any reliance costs.
Because the foregoing clause institutes a graduated set of damages based on a
reasonable calculation of potential harm, it should satisfy the standards set forth by
Posner in his discussion of liquidated damages provisions:
When a contract specifies a single sum in damages for any and all
breaches even though it is apparent that all are not of the same
gravity, the specification is not a reasonable effort to estimate
damages; and when in addition the fixed sum greatly exceeds the
actual damages likely to be inflicted by a minor breach, its character
as a penalty becomes unmistakable.103
Mr. Bo Howard (J.D. 2003, The George Washington University Law School) and I created this
hypothetical during a negotiating exercise.
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Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985).

88

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 8

Perhaps most important is that a liquidated damages provision would assuage
the concerns of the moral scholars. Both parties have agreed to a liquidated damages
clause, such as the one just described. As a result, the virtues of cooperation,
reciprocity, and mutuality are preserved. Thus, there is no element of surprise or
regret since such possible future responses are accommodated and accounted for in
the contract.
These considerations will still not satisfy some moral scholars who subscribe
to the belief that a breach of contract is still “wrong,”104 and is most abhorrent when
the breach is for economic gain. Moreover, liquidated damages provisions are not
warmly received by the courts. As contract remedies are designed to compensate, a
liquidated damages provision that appears to be punitive will not be enforced.105
Finally, it is possible that a liquidated damages provision cannot be negotiated since
the promisee will not want the other party to breach at all; he can achieve this either
by not agreeing to any provision, or by agreeing to a liquidated damages amount that
is exorbitantly high such that the opportunity to breach in order to pursue a more
profitable contract is foreclosed.
Even so, liquidated damages may represent the best way to reconcile
members of the law and economics school and moral scholars. As the parties
negotiate such a clause, the promisee will bargain for an amount that will make him
indifferent to a breach, so the promisee can allow the promisor to breach for a more
profitable contract.
2. Transaction Costs
One of the reasons a compensatory sum is insufficient to offset the losses of
the non-breaching party is that it is not the same as the indifference sum. In
addition, a compensatory sum fails to take into consideration the transaction costs
incurred by the non-breaching party. For example, in our accident example, if I am
provided with $4,500 for the accident (which is not sufficient to make me indifferent
as to the accident with compensation versus no accident), the $4,500 does not
compensate me for the transaction costs I suffered, such as the costs of suing the
breaching party.

104 Linzer, supra note 17, at 111 (“Absent unconscionability, incapacity, or a like excuse, it should be
wrong to break a contract.” (emphasis added)).
105

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
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Accordingly, transaction costs are likely to prevent most breaches from being
efficient, even in the Pareto optimal sense. Transaction costs can render a breach
that one thought to be efficient into one that is not profitable or socially beneficial.
For instance, in our example with the liquidated damages provision, if A breached its
contract with B during the first month and forfeited $18,500, then entered into a
second contract for $30,000 (for a net gain of $11,500), the transaction costs
incurred by the breaching party, the promisee, and the third party may be greater
than $11,500, thus negating A’s individual gain and decreasing social wealth.
The first category of transaction costs arise during the negotiations—when a
party is attempting to figure out if another party is likely to breach, and where a party
will engage in more stringent bargaining over the terms of the contract. These
transaction costs arise out of what Akerlof termed the “Market for Lemons,”106 and
affect all market participants since a contracting party cannot be certain who will be a
party prone to breach (a “lemon”) or who will honor his word (a “good car”).
Breaches, then, cause all market participants to lose faith in the contracting process
and thus in the market mechanism itself, a loss that translates into greater transaction
costs when contracting partners are sought and when negotiation commences.
A related cost is to the breaching party himself, who will likely suffer damage
to his reputation. Following the breach, when market participants are looking for
parties to contract with, they will not be as willing to bargain or negotiate with a
party who has previously breached a contract where the reasons were entirely within
the breaching party’s control. Moreover, even if a party takes the risk with a person
or a corporation who has deliberately breached before, that party may negotiate for
more onerous terms to ensure there will not be a breach.
Other transaction costs involved deal with the breach itself, namely the
expenses incurred by both parties in resolving their dispute through negotiation,
arbitration, or litigation; the promisee’s costs in finding another person to provide
the goods or services required; and the breaching party’s expenses in negotiating the
new contract with the third party offering a more profitable deal. The litigation costs
can be significant, especially if there is evidence of “bad faith” between the parties
(as a breach would evince). One would expect such proceedings to be particularly
adversarial (e.g., during discovery motions). Professor Ian Macneil explains that a
party in breach
pays no attention to the transaction costs of talking after a breach.
And this is so despite the fact that “talking after a breach” may be
106

See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
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one of the more expensive forms of conversation to be found,
involving, as it so often does, engaging highpriced [sic] lawyers, and
gambits like starting litigation, engaging in discovery, and even trying
and appealing cases.107
3. Externalities
One of the hallmarks of the study of economics is the recognition that
externalities are per se inefficient. An externality occurs “[w]hen an individual bears
part of the benefits or part of the costs of his precaution.”108 “[T]he incentives of
private individuals are socially efficient when costs and benefits are fully internalized,
whereas incentives are inefficient when some costs and benefits are externalized.”109
When a party in breach considers whether or not he should breach, he does
not consider the number of costs that are borne by society and others if he does
breach. For example, breaches will almost certainly lead to litigation or other dispute
resolution mechanisms so that the promisee can obtain compensation. However,
the litigation costs of the promisee are borne by the promisee. The “American Rule”
governing attorney’s fees, which states that each party generally bears its own
expenses of litigation,110 prevents these litigation costs from being properly assigned
to the breaching party so that these costs can be internalized. Also, the party in
breach does not consider the costs to society, which are elucidated by Akerloff.111
When a party breaches, other participants in the market will endure costs in
determining whether other parties may breach, and they thus may discount the value
of the contract. This discounted value will not mirror the efficient price in a market,
as a price should ideally be set where marginal cost (supply) equals marginal utility
(demand).112 Thus, there is a deadweight loss to society. Moreover, as a
compensatory sum is not equivalent to an indifference sum, incomplete
107

Macneil, supra note 60, at 968-69.

108 Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3
(1985) [hereinafter Unity in Tort].
109

Id.
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See Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gamache, 686 N.E.2d 989, 991 (1997).
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See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.

112 See Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA.
TAX REV. 501, 522 (1997).
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compensation will result in an externality borne by the promisee.
compensation is imperfect, the other party will bear some of the cost.113
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When

These considerations, especially the transaction costs and the externalities
imposed on parties other than the decision-maker, as well as on future market
participants, indicate that the theory of efficient breach is not likely to be realized in
actual experience.
B. Internalizing the Costs
1. Holmes’ “Bad Man”
The notion that the law ensures the integrity of the market (e.g., by guarding
against fraud or contracts made under duress) implies that sanctions must be applied
to discourage antisocial behavior. In economic terms, sanctions add to the cost of
socially undesirable behavior that is likely to impose an externality on society (e.g.,
pollution or stealing what is not one’s own). Sanctions thus act as a deterrent
because the penalty (e.g., a fine or punishment) forces the actor to consider or
internalize the total cost of his actions—a total cost that may be greater than the
expected benefit from the behavior.
Other than finding a more profitable contract (the reward), paying a
compensatory sum (the sanction) is all the party in breach has to worry about to
engage in an ostensibly efficient breach. We need not worry about men whose
conduct can be restrained by appeals to their conscience. However, we must be
concerned with the “bad men” described by Holmes, viz., individuals who obey the
law only because of the sanctions.114 According to Posner, law is a substitute for
morality, since moral claims cannot always restrain behavior where sanctions can.115
Indeed, “law backs up morality, adding temporal sanctions to the sanctions of
conscience . . . .”116 Thus, for Posner, the law is separate from morality due to the
fact that the law is obeyed because of sanctions, not because there is a moral duty to
do so.117
113

Unity in Tort, supra note 108, at 6.
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JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 223-24.
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Id. at 136-37.
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PROBLEMATICS, supra note 14, at 108.
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See JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 136-37.
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The “penalty” or remedy for a breach of contract is usually restitution,
reliance damages, or expectation damages. Because only reasonably foreseeable
reliance damages are protected, expectation damages will equal the value of
performance, and restitution is the value of the benefit conferred; this compensatory
sum can often be estimated with reasonable accuracy by the party considering
whether to breach (that is, whether the breach will be efficient).
The question then becomes, if a purported efficient breach is usually
inefficient and if appealing to one’s conscience is inadequate to restrain socially
undesirable behavior, then what sanctions should the law impose on the breaching
party? That is, what remedies should the law entertain in order for a breach to be
efficient or socially desirable?
2. Other Remedies
a. Liquidated Damages
The first damage remedy that may allow for costs to be internalized is a
liquidated damages clause. As noted above, both parties negotiate a liquidated
damages provision at contract formation. As a result, if a breach occurs, the
allocation of costs is already determined. If the costs are greater than the liquidated
damages that have been negotiated, the non-breaching party has voluntarily assumed
that risk.
Despite the appeal of a liquidated damages clause, an appeal that extends to
both the law and economics school and to the moral commentators, there are several
problems with this remedy. First, such clauses would only address the transaction
costs that may be endured by the promisor and the promisee that relate specifically
to this contract. However, other market participants will still be affected if certain
participants opportunistically breach. This may force more and more parties to
adopt liquidated damages provisions, which would require more costly and complex
negotiations. Second, liquidated damages provisions have not been favorably
received by the courts. The courts will not enforce liquidated damages clauses that
are deemed to be a penalty. Therefore, while a liquidated damages provision is
potentially a more satisfactory remedy than restitution, reliance, or expectation
damages, the courts may not enforce the provision if it is found to be penal rather
than compensatory. The fact that courts may not enforce a liquidated damages
provision presents a difficulty to the parties to a contract: the parties may have, in
good faith, intended to negotiate a fair liquidated damages provision, yet the court
may not agree that the terms are compensatory. This difficulty is especially
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pronounced since, as Posner observed, there is a “fuzzy line between penalty clauses
and liquidated-damages clauses.”118
b. British Rule
The promisor and promisee both bear the costs of litigation when a breach
occurs. The promisor, in the calculus of an efficient breach, does not consider the
litigation costs of the promisee. One way to require the promisor to internalize this
externality would be to adopt the “British Rule,” which requires the loser to pay the
litigation costs of both parties.119 If a liquidation damages provision was enforced
along with the “British Rule,” the promisor would internalize more of the costs, and
a breach would be more efficient than it is under the current rules. However, some
inefficiency could still occur because, inter alia, the reputational costs of both parties
and the costs to other market participants would still remain. It would appear that
adopting a joint regime of upholding liquidated damages clauses and applying the
“British Rule” would significantly reduce the inefficiency that results from a breach
of contract.
c. Specific Performance
It has been argued with some considerable force “that in the absence of
stipulated remedies in the contract that survive scrutiny on the usual formation
defenses, specific performance is more likely than any form of money damages to
achieve efficiency in the exchange and breach of reciprocal promises.”120 Specific
performance is a judicial decree “requiring the promisor to perform his contractual
promise or forbidding him from performing the promise with any other party.”121
Thus, in our first example from Part I, A would have to deliver the widgets to B,
because it will be prevented from delivering them to C. Thomas Ulen suggests that a
decree of specific performance “should be understood as an instruction to the
litigants to use the market, rather than the court, to solve their dispute.”122 In other
118

Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1286 (7th Cir. 1985).

See Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information Model of Litigation, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 153,
154 (2002) [hereinafter Hylton].
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Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83
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words, a decree of specific performance is actually an order to A and B that they
should negotiate a proper settlement or release on their own, outside of the courts.
Therefore, it is contended that specific performance will promote greater
efficiency for three reasons. First, Ulen argues that if the promisor and promisee
“are on notice that valid promises will be specifically enforced, they will more
efficiently exchange reciprocal promises at formation time. . . . Second, and perhaps
most importantly, specific performance offers the most efficient mechanism for
protecting subjective values attached to performance”123 Finally, the parties will
negotiate after the breach to resolve the dispute on their own, rather than requiring
the courts to calculate damages.124
The second reason explains why the first is not compelling under the current
legal regime. Specific performance is generally granted only when damages are
inadequate125 and the decree will not result in unfairness to either party.126 In other
words, courts are reluctant to grant specific performance. As a result, if parties
understand that specific performance will only be ordered in exceptional
circumstances, they will not have an added incentive to negotiate for more efficient
exchanges of promises when the contract is formulated. Thus, while the second
reason is true, it will only be realized in those instances where the courts find
damages to be inadequate (e.g., when there is a unique product or an idiosyncratic
value that cannot be adequately compensated for), which is a narrow subset of
contract cases. Accordingly, the parties will not guard against a possible decree of
specific performance when they create the contract.
The third claim of efficiency is not persuasive for an entirely separate reason.
Ulen states, “There may be a very high probability of noncompliance, owing,
perhaps, to the breacher’s having forcefully and convincingly indicated his refusal to
comply.”127 It is this same rationale that explains why negotiation after a breach will
be problematic. Since a party, through breaching, has indicated he would rather
pursue his unilateral financial interests than honor his commitment to the promisee,
it is unlikely that the parties will be able to reach an agreement on the promisee’s
123

Id. at 365.
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damages without significant costs (as parties who are not in accord as to
performance will be unlikely to agree on damages without difficulty).
Moreover, Ulen states that while a decree of specific performance “gives the
breacher a much better bargaining position in the post-breach negotiations than
would be the case under a contract in which the quality of the breacher’s
performance was not solely in the breacher’s hands,”128 such increased bargaining
power may result in (1) extortion, since the promisee may negotiate and say “offer
me more money or else I will opt for performance,” or (2) the promisee not
negotiating at all since he would prefer performance (due to his subjective valuation
of performance or its uniqueness). An efficient breach will not result in either case.
In the first scenario, the promisee can make a settlement so expensive as to preclude
the breach from being efficient, which he can do with little effort since he has the
upper hand. In the second scenario there would be no breach. If the promisor
actually performed, there would be significant costs to the judicial system to
supervise the performance, whether this supervision is conducted by a special master
or by other appointed official.129
d. Sharing of Profits
The parties could negotiate to share the profits from the efficient breach, or
the courts could order the party in breach to surrender some of his gain to the
promisee. Professor Farnsworth has suggested that the parties should negotiate on
their own to split the proceeds from an efficient breach.130 Thus, the promisor
should say to the promisee, “It would be to our mutual advantage to negotiate a
release to permit me to sell the widget to the second buyer at a profit, which you and
I could divide.”131
This idea is reminiscent of our discussion of specific performance and Ulen’s
notion that a decree of specific performance is actually an implied order to the
parties to negotiate a solution on their own. A release that would result in the
sharing of the profits from an efficient breach is one possible solution that the
promisor and the promisee can negotiate. However, this type of release or
settlement is still amenable to the criticisms we levied against the negotiations that
128
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may result after a decree of specific performance (e.g., negotiations will be arduous
due to the strained relations between the parties, and the promisee may demand
performance rather than money).
Fraud, dishonesty, and strategic behavior can all act to preclude the sharing
of profits from being truly fair or without significant costs to either side. For
example, the promisor may exaggerate his own costs and understate the expected
profits from the second contract, while the promisee may exaggerate his reliance
costs and expected profits from the original contract. Moreover, the externalities
after the breach to the future market participants and to the parties when they
attempt to reenter to market are still left unresolved if the two parties share profits.
Aside from a court granting specific performance and implying that the
parties should negotiate a settlement, a judge could order the breaching party to
disgorge part of his profits to the non-breaching party. Perhaps restitution would
provide the basis for such a novel remedy, as this form of remedy would hold that
the breaching party unjustly benefited from the non-breaching party while
simultaneously making him worse off. Since the difference between the breaching
party and the non-breaching party is two units (gain to the former and loss to the
latter), a payment of restitution would aim to even out the unjust enrichment by
requiring the breaching party to pay damages to the non-breaching party.
While the basis for this suggestion is arguably grounded in restitution, the
remedy of disgorgement is a significant departure from the accepted contract
remedies. Restitution requires a breaching party to compensate the non-breaching
party for the value of the benefit conferred so that the non-breaching party can be
returned to the status quo ante. If the breaching party were to share part of his profits
with the non-breaching party, this would likely exceed the actual benefit that the
breaching party has received in fact from the non-breaching party. Thus, the
disgorgement remedy would actually go beyond the general restitutionary principle
of unjust enrichment. To be sure, the enforced sharing of profits through
disgorgement would arguably require the breaching party to internalize the costs of
his breach more completely and would further compensate the non-breaching party
for the costs he has endured (e.g., litigation costs).
There are two possible reasons why a disgorgement remedy might not be
acceptable to judges. First, contract remedies are designed to compensate, and
requiring the breaching party to surrender part of his profits may be seen as a
penalty. For example, another way to frame the suggestion that a breaching party
share part of his profits is for the court to impose a tax on the breach by taking a
certain amount that would be immediately passed to the non-breaching party. While
such a tax would make breaching more costly and thus provide less incentive to
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breach, this could be seen as a penalty, which would not pass judicial muster under
current contract law. Second, having a party explicitly surrender profits resembles
disgorgement, which is almost universally disfavored by the courts, 132 even where the
breach is intentional and done in bad faith.
Despite the infirmities of this suggestion, it should be noted that there is an
element of mutuality that is implicit in having the two parties “share” profits from a
breach. That is, the two parties can both benefit from an efficient breach and more
of the transaction costs can be internalized. However, it is still unlikely that this
solution will result in complete efficiency because, even if this remedy is granted in
all possible efficient breach of contract cases, the externalities imposed on society
and the contracting parties generally still remain.
e. Punitive Damages
Finally, some legal scholars have argued that courts could impose punitive
damages on the breaching party when the breach is deliberate or made in bad faith.
Posner, of course, opposes this suggestion; he states, “If [the breaching party] is
forced to pay [punitive damages], an efficient breach may be deterred, and the law
doesn’t want to bring about such a result.”133 Posner also argues that “public policy
does not call for an independently deterrent award beyond compensatory
damages”134 because efficient breaches can bring about an increase in social wealth.
As noted previously, punitive damages could successfully deter breaches and
make them more expensive, thus leading to an internalization of certain costs that
should be borne by the decision-maker. However, such a tax on the breaching
party’s behavior will still not cure the externalities that breaches impose on society
and on contracting parties generally. Most importantly, contract remedies are
traditionally designed to compensate, not to punish. Punitive damages are per se
non-compensatory, and thus will be reluctantly granted by the courts, if at all.135

The theory is more acceptable in cases of a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Earthinfo, Inc. v.
Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1995) (relying on the disgorgement theory).
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of efficient breach is at the forefront of the developing
landscape of American jurisprudence and contract law. The emerging influence of
the social sciences, especially economics, has led to considerable debate in intellectual
literature and in court opinions about the efficacy of this doctrine. The extent to
which one believes that the social sciences should modify or supplant traditional
contract law, and morality should command or guide the law, influence where one
stands on this doctrine.
The moral scholars contend that an efficient breach severs mutuality and the
virtue of social cooperation because contracts that formalize exchanges are devices
to serve the mutual interests of the participants and the greater society. In engaging
in a contract, parties assume the risk that their expected profits might not materialize
and that they might even endure a loss, while remaining bound to their contract.
Proponents of the efficient breach theory, however, advocate that one should be
allowed to renege on one’s commitment and revisit the decision to enter into the
contract in the first place. A breach in this manner degrades the very process that
allows individual strangers to be better off, to satisfy their needs and wants, and
increase their utility. To break one’s word should offend one’s conscience; it should
make one ashamed that he has abused the trust of others in the name of unilateral
profit. To breach for the sake of a missed opportunity, even if it can result in more
money, is dishonorable. To say that society benefits financially is to ignore the very
real prospect that deliberate breaches corrupt the integrity and cooperative essence
of society. This moral view asks whether society gains at all with an efficient breach,
and further asks why social wealth or maximization should be of greater esteem than
honor, respect, trust, and mutual benefit.
In the alternative, if one does not accept this moral argument against the
doctrine, we have attempted to demonstrate that the increase in social wealth
promised from an efficient breach is unlikely to be realized in actual experience.
There are significant transaction costs endured by the non-breaching party (e.g.,
litigation costs, having to find a replacement for the performance, negotiating extra
hard with future market participants to guard against another breach), the breaching
party (e.g., litigation costs, having other market participants negotiate more
stringently to prevent a breach, the difficulty of finding a willing market participant
despite one’s reputation), and society generally (e.g., the situation in Akerloff’s
“Market for Lemons”). These externalities strongly indicate that an efficient breach
in Posner’s theory is not likely to be efficient. The simple calculus of subtracting the
first contract amount from the second and then deducting the promisee’s expected
damages is not sufficient to ascertain whether the breaching party and society will be
better off due to the breach.
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If there is an externality not accounted for by the breaching party—the
decision-maker—the question arises whether any other contract remedy can help
internalize this cost so that the probability of an efficient breach is greater. While we
may wish for the breaching party to internalize the costs that he imposes on others
when he breaches, such a result cannot be achieved under contract law doctrine by
any means that would be deemed not punitive, including actual punitive damages, a
disgorgement of profits, or a liquidated damages provision that is deemed a penalty.
In addition, general application of the “American Rule”136 means that the nonbreaching party will incur significant externalities in the form of litigation costs.
Assuming the courts adopt one or a combination of these expanded remedies, a
significant externality will still burden other market participants, who will be making
contracts with the uncertainty of whether a breach will occur. It is unlikely that
expanded remedies could offset the discounted value of contracts that would result
from the wide adoption of the efficient breach doctrine.
Liquidated damages present the most attractive of the expanded contract
remedies, since mutuality is preserved and the risks and costs are allocated by the
parties themselves. However, the costs imposed on society137 still remain and are
substantial.
We have contended vigorously that there are externalities imposed on society
that are not considered by the breaching party, and it may seem as if we are
overstating the importance of this possible cost. However, a cursory examination of
the stock market should lead one to understand the impact a few bad apples (e.g.,
Enron, Worldcom, et cetera) can have on all prospective investors who are fearful
that another corporation may turn into a Global Crossing or Tyco. The lack of
consumer confidence in corporations mirrors the possible loss of confidence
potential parties to a contract may experience in other parties and in the institution
of contracting itself.
Under the current contract law regime, legal scholars advocating the efficient
breach theory cannot reasonably contend that it will result in wealth maximization
when it is beyond question that a breach of contract creates significant
externalities—degrading contracts as an instrument of social cooperation and
debasing the virtues of mutuality and reciprocity that form the essence of social
136 Hylton, supra note 119, at 154 (stating that American rule is where “each party pays for its own
litigation costs”).

These costs, for example, include discounting goods and services out of fear of breach, negotiating
more rigorously for favorable terms and to prevent the other side from breaching, and deterring
participants from engaging in long-term exchanges at all.
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interaction and dependency. Those concerned that the doctrine of efficient breach
will somehow rise in popularity should take solace in the fact that the influence of
this doctrine is confined to academia, that very few courts have relied on this
doctrine, and even Posner himself has not used the efficient breach theory to justify
any decision, even though he has used extensive dicta to promote the doctrine.
At the very least, Posner and his colleagues should acknowledge that the
efficient breach theory is unlikely to produce its promised gains in social wealth,
especially because it threatens to disrupt the social institutions that are essential to
the efficacy of private contracts.

